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We test the relationship between the size of regional trade agreements (RTA) and openness by 
using a gravity equation with multilateral trade factors. Our sample includes eleven RTAs, seven 
with constant membership and four with expanding membership. Regional trade bias declines 
with the size of the club; three of the four expanding RTAs have already surpassed their 
‘optimal’ size. We also explore the link between openness of the RTA and the geographic 
strategy of the multinational enterprise. We find strong evidence in favor of the regionalization 
strategy, which has been enhanced by the presence of RTAs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) are an integral part of the international trade system and have 
been since the European Economic Community was launched in 1958. Two observations stand 
out. The first is that RTAs have been rapidly rising in numbers and complexity (Crawford & 
Fiorentino, 2005).
1 The second is that several of them have expanded in membership and in 
relative economic size. The European Union (EU) has grown from the original six members of 
1958 to the current (2007) size of 27; and further enlargements are in the making. The economic 
size of the EU is now comparable to that of the United States. The Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) has gone through a few expansion phases; as of 2007, it had 10 
members and one candidate, East Timor, waiting to join. The economic size of ASEAN is 
approximately 15 per cent of that of the EU. The North American Free Trade Association 
(NAFTA) has enlarged once, in 1994 with the addition of Mexico to Canada and the United 
States. The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) has also enlarged once, in 2006 with the 
addition of Venezuela to the original four members; it has five associate members and one 
observer. 
The RTA phenomenon has sparked a growing literature on the role of RTAs in the 
international trade system; see review article by Panagariya (2000). Our paper intends to address 
empirically the relationship between RTA size and trade bias and then connect different degrees 
of openness of the blocs to alternative expansion strategies of multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
On the first relationship, we are motivated by an old question and a new question. The old 
question is whether RTAs are “building” or “stumbling” blocs, where “building” means that 
RTAs expand world trade and “stumbling” means the opposite.
2 A pure building bloc occurs 
when RTA members’ trade with one another in excess of the trade flows implied by a reference 3 
 
model and without any reduction of trade flows between members and non-members, again 
beyond the trade flows implied by a reference model. This corresponds to the case of trade 
creation without trade diversion in Viner’s (1950) classic study of customs unions. If trade 
diversion occurs, the RTA expands world trade only if trade creation exceeds trade diversion; we 
may call it a weak building bloc. If trade diversion fully offsets trade creation, the RTA fully 
reallocates trade from outsiders to insiders; we may call it a weak stumbling bloc. If trade 
diversion more than fully offsets trade creation, the RTA is a pure stumbling bloc. 
The new question deals with RTA expansion. Larger internal markets resulting from 
expanding RTAs may make it easier to implement beyond-the-border liberalization programs, as 
the EU did in the 1980s with its internal market initiative. Trade creation rises, but trade 
diversion may rise as well. Since larger RTAs tend to have a higher ratio of internal trade to 
GDP than smaller RTAs, the pressure to liberalize trade with non-members may decline. Not 
surprisingly, the EU and the United States protect sensitive sectors like agriculture and textiles 
where developing countries have a comparative advantage.
3 In the end, whether an expanding 
RTA tends to be more of a building than a stumbling bloc is an empirical issue. 
On the relationship between RTAs and the activity of the MNEs, the literature seems to 
provide little guidance. Indeed, Dunning, Fujita, and Yakova (2007) and Buckley et al. (2001) 
emphasize that further research on the role of enlarged RTAs are required to understand MNE 
globalization and regionalization strategies and the impact of regional integration on foreign 
direct investment (FDI). We gain more insights from the theories of foreign direct investment, an 
activity predominantly undertaken by MNEs. Traditional theories underscore the substitutability 
between exports and FDI in an environment of declining trade costs (Brainard 1997; Markusen 
& Venables 2000). Yet, the data show that these two variables have a positive correlation. Newer   4
models try to predict complementarity between exports and FDI by focusing on the incentives of 
lower-cost MNEs to acquire foreign higher-cost MNEs after a liberalization program in the host 
country or horizontal investment abroad to exploit export opportunities in a larger economic area 
like a RTA (Neary, 2006, 2007). In a world interlaced with RTAs, the MNE can pursue several 
alternative strategies: it can be global in the sense that it can operate in more than one RTA 
market, as well as in countries that are not affiliated to RTAs; it can be regional in the sense that 
the bulk of its activities is carried out inside a given RTA without a dominant domestic focus; it 
can be regional-domestic in the sense that the bulk of its activities takes place in the home 
market. The relevance of the RTA is that it conditions the environment in which the MNE 
operates. The more open the environment the more likely that the RTA will find it profitable to 
be outward looking. 
  Our research strategy is as follows. We first estimate the size of the regional trade bias 
and trade diversion for each of eleven RTAs relative to a reference model. The reference model 
is the gravity equation (GE) of bilateral trade flows developed by Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003, AvW for short); our sample period covers 24 years, 1980 through 2003. A critical feature 
of this GE is that trade flows, not only reflect the forces of bilateral trade barriers, but also the 
barriers between all other countries and a given country pair. Older GEs that ignore multilateral 
trade factors are fraught with an omitted variable problem and do not yield consistent and 
efficient estimates of trade creation and trade diversion; consequently, the empirical findings 
based on these older GEs have to be taken with a grain of salt (Carrère, 2006). We will also 
estimate trade creation and trade diversion effects for the different sizes of four RTAs that have 
enlarged over the sample period. These estimates allow us to infer whether size increases have 
gone more in the direction of enhancing than erecting obstacles to world trade growth. We then 5 
 
move to firm-level behavior with an intention to show that there is a connection between the 
“macro” and the “micro” results. We will build an empirical model that explains the MNE’s 
foreign activity in terms of, among other things, participation in the inside and outside-RTAs and 
degrees of openness of these institutions.  
The paper is organized as follows. We first review the theoretical and empirical literature 
on the relationship between the size of RTAs, trade creation and trade diversion. We then 
formulate the gravity equation with multilateral trade factors and the main econometric issues 
underlying the testing of this equation. Next, we discuss the “macro” empirical findings. Next, 
we analyze empirically the relevance of the RTA environment for MNEs’ activity with firm-
level data. The final section is dedicated to concluding comments. 
 
SIZE OF RTA, TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION 
In this section we review the essential theoretical literature that relates to our topic of the 
relationship between RTA size and global trade, as well as some of the empirical literature on the 
trade creation and trade diversion effects due to RTAs.  
Krugman (1991) examines the trade effects of an expansion in the size of trading blocs. 
His point of departure is an exogenous number of RTAs of equal size, which set tariffs non-
cooperatively. An increase in the size of the blocs produces a classic combination of trade 
creation and trade diversion. The enlarging RTAs divert trade partly because some of the trade 
between blocs occurs now within the blocs and partly because these charge a higher external 
tariff. Welfare level is described by a U-shaped function in the number of RTAs. A single RTA 
in the world does best because it promotes global free trade; many RTAs do well because they 
have small power and levy low tariffs; and an intermediate number of RTAs produces the worst   6
outcome. Trade diversion occurs if instead the tariffs are set cooperatively. Bond and Syropoulos 
(1996) relax Krugman’s assumption of symmetric blocs and obtain that a bloc has an incentive to 
enlarge because by expanding it can increase welfare for its members above the free trade level. 
A more ambiguous case for RTAs comes from Yi’s (1996) model of endogenous customs union 
under imperfect competition. With symmetric countries, welfare improves for member countries 
but declines for non-member countries. Customs unions can perform as building blocs (towards 
global free trade) under open regionalism, where any country that applies to an RTA is accepted; 
however, they can become stumbling blocs when the decision to enlarge requires unanimity. 
Andriamananjara (1999) develops a model of endogenous RTAs from a setting in which 
each national market has a single firm and is perfectly segmented, yet all firms produce perfectly 
substitutable goods. RTAs expand because firms make higher profits in a larger RTA than in a 
smaller RTA; clearly, insiders must allow the expansion. A larger club has two effects. The first 
is the noted positive effect on profits due to a larger market with preferential treatment. The 
profit effect, however, declines as the RTA enlarges because the oligopoly power of each firm 
declines with RTA size. The second effect is that the formation of an RTA reduces the profits of 
the outsiders, which have an incentive to join the RTA. The optimal size of the club is not the 
world because insiders have an interest in restraining membership. 
On the empirical side, Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1996) estimate a bilateral trade GE for 63 
countries for the period 1965-1992 and find positive and statistically significant regional trade 
biases and a mixture of trade creation and trade diversion effects. Soloaga and Winters (2001) 
estimate a GE for 58 countries for the period 1980-1996, separating import from export trade 
diversion effects. Unlike Frankel et al. (1996), they do not find statistically significant regional 
trade biases, but uncover import and export trade diversion for the EU and EFTA. Latin 7 
 
American RTAs, on the other hand, expanded total imports. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) 
detect trade diversion effects in the EU: the annual growth of trade between member countries 
and industrial non-member countries fell by 1.7 percentage points over 1956-1973. Crawford and 
Laird (2001) analyze trade data from six RTAs and find that for the period 1990-1999 the 
average annual growth of imports from non-members is slightly smaller than the average annual 
growth of insiders’ imports. 
  It is worth repeating that empirical work based on old GEs –those that ignore multilateral 
trade factors– may be unreliable. Carrère (2006), after correcting for possible econometric 
misspecifications of the GE (which will be discussed in the next section), finds that her sample 
of seven RTAs generates a mixture of trade creation and trade diversion effects. In particular, 
regional trade biases, over the period 1962 to 1996, were increasing through the expansion 
phases of the EU, MERCOSUR and NAFTA, accompanied often by a decline of imports from 
and exports to outsiders. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) adopt a research similar to Carrère’s (again, 
see next section) and find strong evidence of the RTA average contribution to expand member 
countries’ trade. Their paper, however, neither sorts out trade creation from trade diversion 
effects nor explores the marginal contribution of RTA size to bilateral imports.  
 
THE GRAVITY EQUATION AND ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
It is now accepted that bilateral trade flows are best explained by the GE; see, among others, 
Bergstrand (1985: 474), Leamer and Levinsohn (1995: 1384), Deardorff (1998: 7), and Feenstra, 
Markusen, and Rose. (2001: 431). The GE has been derived from different models of 
international trade, ranging from models of complete specialization and identical consumers’ 
preferences (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Deardorff, 1998) to models of product   8
differentiation in a regime of monopolistic competition (Helpman, 1987) to hybrid models of 
different factor proportions and product differentiation (Bergstrand, 1989) to models of 
incomplete specialization and trading costs (Haveman & Hummels, 2004). For this paper, we 
rely on the formulation by AvW. 
In the AvW setting, countries enjoy complete specialization and consumers have 
homothetic preferences.
4 Country i produces good i at price pi. In country j, the good is sold at 
price pij = pi ( 1 + tij), where tij imbeds a host of trade costs including transport and transaction 
costs, regime costs arising from differences in legal systems and practices, languages, networks, 
competitive policies, and monetary regimes, and tariffs or tariff-equivalent restrictions aimed at 
discriminating against foreign producers. These costs are, for the most part, non-observable and 
are proxied by physical distance, cultural distance and institutional distance. Thus, countries that 
are geographically distant face a higher tij than contiguous pairs; countries that speak the same 
language and have common roots face a lower tij than pairs with heterogeneous cultural 
background; countries that share the same currency and the same central bank face a lower tij 
than nations with different currencies and central banks; and finally countries that belong to the 
same RTA face lower tij than countries that do not. Bilateral trade flows are determined as 
follows (see AvW, eq. 9): 
 
(1)                                                   xij   =  yiyj/yw(tij/PiPj)
1-σ, 
 
where xij = exports from country i to country j, y = income, the subscript w = world, σ = the 
elasticity of substitution coefficient, P = the consumer price level. Pi and Pj stand for the 
multilateral trade costs in the AvW model and are a function of all tij pairs, countries’ income 9 
 
shares and countries’ price levels. For σ > 1, bilateral trade flows rise (fall) if multilateral trade 
costs rise (fall) relative to bilateral trade costs. Pi and Pj are jointly determined and their omission 
creates a bias in the estimated coefficients. 
  The testable equation of (1) is:  
 
(2)             ln(xijt) = α0 + α1ln(yiyj)t + α2ln(IiIj)t + α3ln(dij) + α4CCijt + α5ln Pi  + α6ln Pj + 
                    β1Same-RTAijt + β2Im-RTAijt  + β3Ex-RTAijt + αt + uijt. 
 
The new terms are as follows. I is per capita income; d is distance; CC is a vector of dummy 
variables that capture various types of cost-reducing affinities shared by the pair of countries –
such as common border, common language, common colonizer, common relationship and 
common currency–; the three RTA variables capture trade creation and trade diversion effects 
generated by the RTA and are discussed fully below; at is a time effect common to all country 
pairs; and uijt = μij + εijt, where μij is either a fixed or random unobserved bilateral effect and εijt is 
the residual error term. It should be noted that (2) descends directly from (1). The per capita 
income emerges from (1) through the countries’ income shares that influence the two price 
levels; these income shares are proxied by population.  
 
Trade creation and trade diversion effects and RTA size 
In the GE literature, trade creation and trade diversion effects generated by RTAs have been 
typically modeled by two dummy variables: Same-RTA, which is equal to one when both 
countries in the pair belong to the same RTA and zero otherwise, and Im-RTA, which is equal to 
one when the import country belongs to the RTA and the export country does not and zero   10
otherwise; for more details, see Soloaga and Winters (2001). Pure trade creation is implied by β1 
> 0 and β2 = 0. An expanding RTA that has those empirical characteristics can be said to have 
moved in the direction of an optimal size and to have raised welfare. If β2 is negative, trade 
diversion emerges and the case for RTA depends on the relative numerical size of the positive β1 
and negative β2. An expanding RTA moves weakly in the “good” direction, towards an optimal 
size, if the positive β1 is numerical larger than the negative β2. Pure trade diversion occurs when 
β2 is equal to β1; the expanding RTA, in this case, has moved in the “wrong” direction.  
Soloaga and Winters (2001) point out that this two-dummy approach ignores the effect of 
the RTA on non-members’ exports and the possibility that RTA members can gain at the 
expense of non-members.
5 These authors propose a third dummy, Ex-RTA, which is equal to one 
when the export country belongs to the RTA and the import country does not, and zero 
otherwise. With a three-dummy approach, the assessment of whether an expanding RTA is 
moving in the right or wrong direction depends, not only on the relative numerical size of β1 and 
β2, but also of β1 and β3. Carrère (2006) adopts the Soloaga-Winters three-dummy approach. 
The biggest challenge in estimating (2) is to make sure that one captures the multilateral 
trade factors; otherwise, the error term of the regression will imbed the effects of the variables 
that determine the two sets of prices and will create a bias in the other coefficients of the 
regression. AvW (pp. 179-180) solve the problem by estimating with nonlinear least squares a 
simultaneous system of equations for cross-section data. Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and 
Feenstra (2003) propose the use of country fixed effects, but this alternative is only applicable to 
cross-section data. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) discuss pitfalls of panel estimation in the 
presence of multilateral trade factors. These authors dismiss the use of country fixed effects 
because they fail to take into account that Pi and Pj vary over time. They recommend instead 11 
 
country-pair fixed effects, as well as separate time fixed effects, to capture all pairwise 
idiosyncratic characteristics. In sympathy with AvW’s approach, an earlier study by Bikker 
(1987) had already pointed out that a simple GE cannot correctly estimate trade creation and 
trade diversion due to restrictions on the degree of substitution ( σ in (1)); Bikker estimates 
these substitution effects for import and export countries with a simultaneous equation model. 
Since country fixed effects in the GE estimates imbed that each country-pair has its own degree 
of substitution, Bikker’s model becomes a special case of the country-pair effect GE.
6 Carrère (p. 
231) accepts that country-pair fixed effects yield unbiased estimates of time-varying variables, 
but this model has the drawback of eliminating time-invariant variables. The alternative is to 
estimate country-pair effects as random variables. We will estimate equation (2) under the two 
alternatives of fixed and random country-pair effects, in addition to fixed year effects. We will 
compare the two models and test the null hypothesis that the fixed effects model is not better 
than the random effects model. If the null cannot be rejected, we will then use the random model 
to infer trade creation and trade diversion effects of RTAs. 
Finally, there is the issue of endogenous RTAs. In the theory section, we have referred to 
models where the selection of RTAs is determined endogenously by the models. Baier and 
Bergstrand (2002) report that it is difficult to identify economic and political variables that 
influence the formation of RTAs. In their empirical work these authors obtain unstable estimates 
and resort to the assumption that the RTA phenomenon moves slowly relative to trade flows; any 
potential endogeneity bias can be attenuated with panel estimation. Carrère endogenizes RTAs 
with an instrumental variable technique applied to panel data. Baier and Bergstrand (2007) return 
to the theme of endogeneity and propose various econometric solutions; their preferred one is a 
GE estimated on first-differenced panel data with fixed country-pair effects. We have done   12
similar testing and found no significant difference between the “exogenous” and the 
“endogenous” specification.
7 The focus of this study and space constraints are not suitable for us 
to elaborate on these findings, but we will provide them to interested readers upon request. In 
sum, based on the principle of parsimony we will report and draw inferences only from the 
“exogenous” specification of RTAs. 
 
DATA 
We briefly discuss our data here and invite the interested reader to check the Indiana University 
CIBER Website (http://www.kelley.iu.edu/ciber/research.cfm) and Appendix 1 for more details.  
Our data set consists of 215,500 annual observations covering 143 countries over the 
period 1980 to 2003: see Appendix 2 for the list of 143 countries. Country-level bilateral imports 
in U.S. dollars come from the World Trade Analyzer (WTA) by Statistics Canada. The 
remainder of the data, with the exception of currency unions and RTAs, come from Rose (2005) 
for the period 1980-1999 and our own update using the same sources as Rose’s for the years 
2000 through 2003. On RTAs, we identify eleven separate agreements that account for 40 
percent of world trade: ASEAN, CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market), EU, 
NAFTA, ANDEAN (Andean Community of Nations), ANZCERTA (the Australia-New Zealand 
Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement), CACM (Central American Common Market), 
MERCOSUR, PATCRA (Papua New Guinea-Australia Trade and Commercial Relations 
Agreement), SPARTECA (South Pacific Region Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement), 
and USIS (the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement). The first four of the eleven RTAs 
have expanded since 1980. Details of the formation and enlargements of the eleven RTAs are 
shown in Appendix 3. 13 
 
   The mean value of bilateral imports is 341 million U.S. dollars, with a range spanning 
from one thousand to 201 billion dollars. The mean value of GDP is 286 billion dollars, with a 
range spanning from 21 million to 11 trillion dollars. The mean value of per capita GDP for 
importing countries is 6,000 dollars, with a range spanning from 83 to 48,000 dollars. The 
average value of distance is 4,589 miles, with a range spanning from 55 miles (Bahrain and 
Qatar) to 12,351 miles (Guyana and Indonesia). Country-pair observations with a common land 
border represent 2.7 per cent of the sample; those with a shared language 21.4 per cent; those 
with a common colonizer 8 per cent; those with a shared colonial relationship 2.3 per cent; those 
with a common currency 0.9 per cent; and those belonging to the same RTA 2.6 per cent. Table 
1 shows descriptive statistics for the three RTA dummy variables for the 11 separate agreements. 
Sample averages for these dummies tend to be relatively low for ASEAN7 (read ASEAN with 7 
members), CARCOM 11, NAFTA2, and EU9, and relatively high for SPARTECA, EU12 and 
E15, with the averages reflecting the size and time length of RTA.  
[Table 1 goes about here] 
 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
Estimates of (2), with both fixed and random country-pair effects and fixed year effects, are 
reported in Table 2. The R squares are high by the standards of the GE equations estimated in the 
literature but are comparable to those reported by Carrère (2006, Table 2). Most coefficients, 
with the exception of those involving RTA dummies, are statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level. In the fixed effects model, the impact of income on bilateral imports is in line with 
prediction, but the impact of per capita income is not. Time-invariant dummy variables are made 
redundant by the estimation of the fixed effects model. The alternative of random country-pair   14
effects passes the Breusch and Pagan (1980) LM test and the Hausman (1978) test that the fixed 
effects model is not better than the random effects model. Therefore, we will concentrate on the 
random effects model for the remainder of our discussion. 
The estimated αs of the random effects model of equation (2) appear to be in line with 
those reported in the literature. The per capita income variable has the predicted sign, in contrast 
to the fixed model. The size of the elasticity of bilateral imports with respect to income is less 
than one; the elasticity with respect to distance is numerically larger than one and confirms to be 
a powerful force in the gravity equation; geographical proximity and cultural affinity variables 
enhance trade. Countries that share a common currency do not trade any more than those that 
have different currencies (the coefficient of common currency is not different from zero at the 10 
per cent significance level). This result may be surprising given that Rose (2000) has reported 
that countries with a common currency trade three times as much as countries with different 
currencies (and fluctuating exchange rates). However, Rose’s (2000) finding has been met with 
skepticism from the start; see the comments to Rose by Persson (2001). From the viewpoint of 
this paper, the serious problem with Rose’s GE equation is the omission of multilateral trade 
factors. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) focus on Rose’s finding to demonstrate the distortion that 
such an omission can create. To check on this point, when we estimated (2) with fixed 
importing-country (instead of fixed country-pair effects) and year effects, the coefficient of 
common currency turned out to be 0.62 and statistically significant at the 1 per cent level.
8   
[Table 2 goes about here] 
 
Non-expanding RTAs 
Having disposed of the general characteristics of the estimated GE, we can now concentrate on 15 
 
the impact of RTAs on bilateral trade flows. We recall that our sample includes 11 RTAs, of 
which four have expanded at least once since 1980. We consider first the non-expanding RTAs. 
SPARTECA is the pristine example of a pure building bloc towards global free trade, with a 
strong regional trade bias accompanied by expansion of imports and exports to the rest of the 
world. ANDEAN as well is a building bloc, although weaker than SPARTECA: it has a sizeable 
regional trade bias and a small import trade diversion.
9 USIS has a positive regional trade bias 
but also a fully offsetting import trade diversion; there is also some evidence of export trade 
diversion.
10 Therefore, USIS is a pure trade diversion case and an obstacle to global free trade. 
The remaining four non-expanding RTAs –ANZCERTA, CACM, MERCOSUR, and PATCRA– 
show evidence of trade diversion, either on the import or the export side, and no evidence of 
positive regional trade bias; they too must be classified as stumbling blocs. In sum, of the seven 
non-expanding RTAs covered by our sample, only two have behaved as building blocs. 
 
Expanding RTAs 
Of the remaining four RTAs, ASEAN, CARICOM and the EU have expanded three times during 
our sample period and NAFTA only once. ASEAN is the perfect example of an expanding 
building bloc. In each successive enlargement, a strong and statistically very significant positive 
regional trade bias has been matched by an equally strong expansion of imports and exports to 
the rest of the world. Judged exclusively in terms of the size of the regional trade bias, ASEAN 
seems to have peaked with a membership of nine; see Table 3.  
The EU can also be considered a building bloc, although weaker than ASEAN. EU9 has a 
marginally significant positive regional trade bias and has expanded imports and exports to the 
rest of the world. EU10 is not statistically different from EU9. With both EU12 and EU15, the   16
regional trade bias remains positive but declines relative to EU9 (see Table 3); import expansion 
disappears with EU12 and becomes outright trade diversion in EU15; export expansion, although 
positive, declines progressively in the two enlargement phases. The data seem to suggest that the 
EU peaked with a membership of ten. One way to interpret this result is that the two 
enlargements, one from 10 to 12 and the other from 12 to 15, have raised the marginal cost for 
the EU to remain open to the outside world. The higher costs reflect a larger and more 
heterogeneous membership, stronger political coalitions against a liberal trade environment, and 
a unanimity decision rule. Higher marginal costs of maintaining an open environment combined 
with declining marginal benefits from expanding trade imply a smaller trade club (Fratianni and 
Pattison, 2001). Clearly, this analysis omits other objectives underlying the expansion of the EU.  
NAFTA can also be judged a building bloc, comparable to the EU but weaker than 
ASEAN. NAFTA2 created no regional trade bias but expanded imports from the rest of the 
world. NAFTA3 has a strong positive regional trade bias and import expansion but diverts 
exports from the rest of the world. Overall, trade creation exceeds trade diversion and this RTA 
makes a contribution to global free trade (see Table 3). 
CARICOM is a classic case of an expanding RTA with a positive regional trade bias 
achieved at the expense of trade with the outside world. Positive internal biases are present in 
CARICOM11, CARICOM12, and CARICOM13; they disappear in CARICOM14. Export trade 
diversion appears consistently through all the expansion phases, whereas import expansion is 
marginally significant in three out of the four bloc sizes. Clearly, CARICOM14 is a stumbling 
bloc and a worse outcome for global free trade than when it was smaller (see Table 3). 
In sum, the four expanding RTAs have done better for global free trade than the seven 
static RTAs. ASEAN is the champion of building blocs; the EU and NAFTA have, on balance, 17 
 
contributed to the expansion of world trade; and CARICOM, in its present size, is a stumbling 
bloc. For ASEAN, the EU, and CARICOM regional trade bias has declined with size (see Table 
3). 
[Table 3 goes about here] 
 
RTAs AND MNE STRATEGIES 
In this section, we link the relative openness of the RTAs to the activities of the MNEs, the intent 
being of drawing a parallelism between the macro findings and firm-level behavior. Traditional 
theories of FDI emphasize the critical role of MNEs and the substitutability between FDI and 
exports. A necessary condition for setting a plant in a foreign country is that trade costs must be 
sufficiently high to offset the fixed costs of operating two plants; see, among others, Brainard 
(1997: p.522), Markusen and Venables (2000: p.221) and Neary (2006: p.3). Since trade costs 
have declined in the era of globalization, traditional theory predicts an expansion of exports 
relative to FDI. Instead, the two variables have behaved as complements rather than as 
substitutes. Neary (2006, 2007) provides two theoretical arguments for the complementarity 
findings. The first is that in response to a liberalization in the foreign country, lower-cost firms in 
the home country not only expand their exports but also acquire high-cost firms in the foreign 
country. Thus, exports and FDI outflows move in the same direction. The second, partly related 
to the first, is that liberalization in the foreign country induces home country’s firms to make 
horizontal investments in the foreign country as an export launching pad. The latter is 
particularly relevant when the liberalizing foreign country is an RTA, and even more so when the 
RTA has an active program of creating a single market within its confines (as it is true for the 
EU).   18
  Combining the “new” theory of FDI with our macro findings on RTAs, we can make the 
following three predictions about MNEs’ strategy. First, the costs borne by a MNE in setting and 
operating an affiliate abroad depend partly on firm-specific attributes (FSAs), partly on industry 
specific characteristics and partly on whether the host country belongs to an RTA. FSAs such as 
firm size, R&D intensity, advertising intensity, price competitiveness, leverage, and market 
growth have been identified in the literature as important characteristics that affect MNE 
performance: see, among others, Christophe (1997), Kim and Lyn (1987), Lu and Beamish 
(2004), and Morck and Yeung (1991). Other things the same, foreign activities of MNEs will be 
higher the higher the levels of these FSAs. Second, a MNE, after accounting for FSAs and 
country specific effects, will expand its activities in the member countries of its own RTA in 
preference to expanding activities in non-member countries. This preference will rise the larger 
the size of the RTA (market size) and the more liberal is the RTA environment. Buckley et al. 
note that RTAs provide an opportunity to enjoy the advantages of native and adopted home 
market of RTAs. We call this strategy the regionalization strategy. Third, distance weakens the 
strength of FSAs, a result that mirrors the effect of distance on exports. This puts a severe 
constraint on a globalization strategy, as has been evidenced by Rugman and Verbeke (2004) and 
Ghemawhat (2007). It follows that the MNE’s propensity to expand operations in culturally, 
economically and institutionally different and more physically distant countries, for a given level 
of openness, will be, smaller than the propensity to expand in its own RTA.  
  To test these predictions, we run the following panel regression 
 










izt z FSA * RTA γ
z
+ γ13MKTSIZEjt + γ14RTAit   
                          + γ15NAFTA + γ16EU15 + γ17EU25 + γ18ASEAN + γt + δijt,  19 
 
 
where yijt denotes the share of sales or share of assets at time t located in the jth RTA (either the 
inside RTA or outside RTA) of the ith firm; FSA is a vector that includes the six firm-specific 
attributes mentioned above; MKTSIZE is the relative size of the market; RTA is a dummy that is 
equal to one if the firm is headquartered in an RTA member country and zero otherwise; 
NAFTA, EU15, and EU25 are dummies that are equal to one if the firm is headquartered in a 
member country of the specific RTA and zero otherwise; γt is a year fixed effect common to all 
MNEs’ shares; and δijt is the sum of a fixed industry effect and a residual error term.   
  The selected firms originating from NAFTA, EU, and three non-RTA countries –
Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey– are part of the largest 500 firms listed in the Fortune Global 
500 and comparable number of public firms originating ASEAN countries.
11 Shares of sales and 
shares of assets in the inside RTA and the outside RTAs were collected from the annual reports 
of each firm for the period 2000 - 2006. The source of FSAs is Compustat Global. The source of 
RTA-level characteristics is the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Because of 
incomplete FSA data, our final sample has 120 firms and about 500 observations. Observations 
vary according to the dependent variables; in general, 25% of the observations are from ASEAN 
firms, 45% from EU firms, 20% from NAFTA firms, and 10% from non-RTA country firms. 
More details on the data are available in Appendix 4, which shows the precise empirical 
definition of the variables in (3), and in Appendix 5, which presents summary statistics and the 
correlation matrix. 
  Estimates of (3) are displayed in Table 4. The single most important finding is the 
corroboration that a RTA provides a favorable environment for the MNE to pursue a 
regionalization strategy. The RTA coefficient, in the first column of Table 4, is positive, very   20
statistically significant and economically relevant. MNEs from RTA countries have a four-
percentage point higher sales ratio in the rest of their own RTA than MNEs from non-RTA 
countries; and the result appears to be homogeneous with respect to the three RTAs in the sample. 
Looking at the findings from the asset ratio (column three of Table 4), the RTA regionalization is 
corroborated only for NAFTA MNEs, and it is economically much weaker than for the sales 
ratio. The second most important finding is that MNEs from RTAs do not expand in other RTAs 
relative to non-RTA MNEs. In fact, the RTA coefficient of column two of the table suggests that 
MNEs from RTA countries have almost a two-percentage point lower sales ratio in “outside” 
RTAs than non-RTA MNEs. This result is not homogeneous. RTAs can be ranked as follows in 
terms of access: EU15 is preferred to EU25 and ASEAN, and these three are preferred to 
NAFTA.
12 The ranking is broadly consistent with our macro findings. The assets ratio 
regressions are in line with the sales ratio regressions. The other significant findings of Table 4 
pertain to the relevance of FSAs in determining the external expansion strategy of MNEs. Firm 
size, R&D intensity, and leverage appear to be positive attributes for external expansion, and in 
half of the cases interact negatively with the RTA dummy. Strong FSAs, in particular firm size 
for sales, lead MNEs to expand beyond RTA boundaries. The other FSAs do not emerge as 
statically significant drivers. In sum, firm-level behavior points to a strong RTA regionalization 
strategy.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
Two main conclusions emerge from this paper, one “macro” and one “micro.” The macro 
conclusion is that RTAs have produced a mixed record with respect to the important issue of 21 
 
whether they enhance or hamper freer trade in the world. The micro conclusion is that the RTA 
environment has fostered a regionalization strategy of MNEs.     
  On the macro findings, we recall that seven of the eleven RTAs considered in this paper 
have kept a constant membership and four have enlarged at least once during our sample period. 
In the first group, only ANDEAN and SPARTECA have behaved as building blocs; the 
remaining five have diverted trade against outside countries with little or no trade creation inside 
the RTA. The four expanding RTAs have a much better record as building blocs, with ASEAN 
being the undisputed champion. The smaller EUs have also behaved like ASEAN, but the larger 
EU15 has diverted imports against the outside world. On balance, the EU has made a positive 
contribution to the expansion of world trade. A similar assessment holds for NAFTA. The 
smaller NAFTA showed no evidence of trade diversion against the rest of the world, although it 
did not expand trade among members. The enlarged NAFTA has produced large regional trade 
bias but in part at the expense of diverting exports against the outside world. CARICOM, of the 
four expanding RTAs, has the weakest record as a building bloc. The current size of CARICOM 
is clearly a stumbling bloc. 
The evidence presented in the paper has some bearing on the optimal size of the RTA. 
Judged exclusively on the ability to create trade within the bloc, three out of the four expanding 
RTAs –ASEAN, the EU and CARICOM– have already peaked. But regional trade bias is only 
part of the story. ASEAN has remained a very open club towards the rest of the world through all 
its enlargement phases. The other three RTAs, on the other hand, have diverted trade against the 
rest of the world to different degrees. The EU and NAFTA divert trade in the last round of 
expansion and CARICOM have diverted trade consistently through all expansion phases. While 
it is difficult to predict what future enlargements may bring, we should keep in mind that as size   22
increases heterogeneity of membership rises as well, and with it the cost of achieving and 
maintaining an open trade environment, especially if decision rules are based on unanimity. The 
upshot is that expanding sizes, within the intermediate range, may not only reduce regional trade 
bias but also external openness.  
  Our study has focused on the relationship between RTA size and trade expansion. To the 
extent that countries form new RTAs or join existing ones for other reasons –such as security or 
political issues– we would not expect a predictable relationship between size and openness. 
Indeed, political economy considerations complicate matters in the sense that import trade-
diverting RTAs may be more politically acceptable than trade-creating RTAs because the former 
do not hurt domestic industry, whereas the latter do by replacing domestic production with 
production located in the members’ countries (Krishna 1998).   
  The micro finding that the RTA environment has fostered the multinational enterprise’s 
regionalization strategy is consistent with a growing body of evidence uncovered in the IB 
literature. The limits to globalization may stem from the rising costs the MNE faces as adaptation 
takes place in more distant locations. A host of factors may contribute to these costs, economic 
as well as cultural. Indeed, it is tempting to draw the similarity between the role of distance on 
trade flows and the role of distance on the propensity to adapt by the MNE. This topic is worthy 
of further research. Another aspect of the research that needs more empirical work has to do with 
the type of environment that best suits the MNE. Our regionalization results appear to be 
consistent with the MNE being more capable of exploiting markets’ similarities than differences. 
The newer theory of FDI, with its emphasis on horizontal FDI serving as an export platform for a 
larger area, stresses similarities. Yet, there may be large profit opportunities by exploiting 
differences across industries. The data set, unfortunately, did not permit to discriminate between 23 
 
horizontal and non-horizontal foreign assets, a prerequisite in determining the best economic 
environment of the MNE. It will be part of our future research agenda. Our work has measured 
MNE performance either by shares of sales or shares of assets in host RTAs relative to total sales 
or assets, and not by relative profitability. What needs to be ascertained is whether relative sales 
or relative assets are good proxies of relative rates of return on capital; otherwise, the MNE is 
trading off one for the other.  
  The power of the home RTA in influencing the regionalization strategy of the RTA-based 
MNE can also be seen by the higher propensity of non-RTA MNEs to expand in other RTAs. 
This could be due to the strong comparative advantage that the MNE develops in expanding in 
the home RTA, perhaps precluding the development of those firm-specific resources that make a 
MNE truly global. Future work, both theoretical and empirical, will have to consider what firm-
level resources alter the regional propensity of the MNE. The institutional perspective (e.g., 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) suggests that home RTAs provide relatively similar institutional 
settings that enhance organizational legitimacy without imposing the burden of substantive 
changes in MNEs’ structures and processes. Other approaches can give insights on how MNEs 
gain internalization benefits in the home RTA market, such as the eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 
1981) and internalization theory (Rugman, 1981).    24
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of regional trade agreement dummy variables 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation
Variable Mean  Standard 
Deviation
ANDEAN: Same-RTA  0.0015  0.0385 CARICOM11: Same-RTA  0.0005  0.0213
Export 0.0266  0.1609 Export  0.0036  0.0597
Import 0.0256  0.1578 Import  0.0041  0.0641
ANZCERTA: Same-RTA  0.0002  0.0140 CARICOM12: Same-RTA  0.0018  0.0421
Export 0.0224  0.1479 Export  0.0142  0.1182
Import 0.0187  0.1354 Import  0.0178  0.1321
CACM: Same-RTA  0.0012  0.0347 CARICOM13: Same-RTA  0.0005  0.0221
Export 0.0186  0.1350 Export  0.0038  0.0614
Import 0.0180  0.1329 Import  0.0050  0.0703
MERCOSUR: Same-RTA  0.0007  0.0258 CARICOM14: Same-RTA  0.0012  0.0350
Export 0.0202  0.1407 Export  0.0095  0.0971
Import 0.0172  0.1300 Import  0.0125  0.1111
PATCRA: Same-RTA  0.0002  0.0149 NAFTA2: Same-RTA  0.0000  0.0068
Export 0.0174  0.1308 Export  0.0058  0.0763
Import 0.0158  0.1247 Import  0.0057  0.0752
SPARTECA: Same-RTA  0.0026  0.0508 NAFTA3: Same-RTA  0.0003  0.0167
Export 0.0335  0.1799 Export  0.0162  0.1263
Import 0.0321  0.1763 Import  0.0160  0.1255
USIS: Same-RTA  0.0002  0.0129 EU9: Same-RTA  0.0002  0.0140
Export 0.0182  0.1336 Export  0.0039  0.0621
Import 0.0168  0.1284 Import  0.0037  0.0604
ASEAN6: Same-RTA   0.0014  0.0373 EU10: Same-RTA  0.0013  0.0360
Export 0.0333  0.1794 Export  0.0217  0.1455
Import 0.0285  0.1665 Import  0.0208  0.1428
ASEAN7: Same-RTA   0.0002  0.0136 EU12: Same-RTA  0.0038  0.0612
Export 0.0049  0.0700 Export  0.0488  0.2155
Import 0.0046  0.0673 Import  0.0467  0.2109
ASEAN9: Same-RTA  0.0003  0.0175 EU15: Same-RTA  0.0074  0.0854
Export 0.0058  0.0757 Export  0.0664  0.2491
Import 0.0050  0.0705 Import  0.0621  0.2414
ASEAN10: Same-RTA  0.0010  0.0322    
Export 0.0179  0.1327    
Import 0.0140  0.1176    
Notes: See text for the descriptive statistics of other variables. 29 
 
Table 2 
Estimates of the impact of regional trade agreements on bilateral imports 
 
 
Bilateral Country Pair  
& Year Fixed Effects  
Bilateral Country Pair Random  




Log of nominal GDP  1.0211
*** 0.8160
***
Log of nominal per capita GDP  -0.4450
*** 0.0280
***
Log of distance  NA -1.1406
***
Common border  NA 0.5081
***
Common language  NA 0.3904
***
Common colonizer  NA 0.3566
***
Colonial relationship  NA 1.7811
***































































































































































































F-Test for Fixed Effects  Bilateral Country Pair Fixed 
Effects 
F(15653,199760)= 15.24






(Do not reject Random Effects)






(Fixed effects model is not better 
than random effects model)
 
 R-square
  0.8299 0.8265
Number of obs.  215,000 215,000
Notes: 
† if p < 0.10, 
* if p < 0.05, 
** if p < 0.01, 
*** if p < 0.001. NA stands for not applicable. Year fixed 




Trade creation and trade diversion effects of regional trade agreements 
based on random effects model 


















Same-RTA after expansion = 
before expansion 
a 
NA 0.62 0.79 0.00
Export = Import 
b 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00
 


















Same-RTA after expansion = 
before expansion 
a 
NA 0.17 0.01 0.03
Export = Import 














Same-RTA after expansion = before expansion 
a NA 0.52
Export = Import 
b 0.02 0.00
 


















Same-RTA after expansion = 
before expansion 
a 
NA 0.21 0.57 0.00
Export = Import 


































2)              
Export = Import 
b 0.68  0.20 0.00 0.00 0.07  0.04 0.07
Notes: See notes in Table 2. 
a  Test for equality of regional trade bias coefficients before and after 
expansion of RTA. P-values indicate probabilities of the chi-square that the coefficients are different from 
each other. 
b Test for equality of coefficients of export and import trade diversion. Rejection means that 
country’s trade orientation differs between exports and imports.   32
Table 4 
MNEs’ strategic focus and regional trade agreements 
Notes: Reported values are standardized coefficients and P-values are in the parentheses. 
† if p < 0.10, 
* if 
p < 0.05, 
** if p < 0.01, 
*** if p < 0.001. Intercept and year and industry fixed effects are estimated but not 
reported. Standard errors are also not reported. The coefficient of ASEAN is dropped due to 
multicollinearity. The sample consists of 120 MNEs (but varies across dependent variables) from ASEAN, 
EU, NAFTA, and three non-RTA countries–Norway, Switzerland and Turkey–.  
  Sales Strategic Focus Assets Strategic Focus




























































































Inside RTA MKTSIZE  







Outside RTA MKTSIZE  



































R&D Intensity  













Advertising Intensity  

































































































ASEAN NA    NA NA  NA 
R-square 0.5948 0.5157 0.5118  0.3944




Macro-level data description 
Variables  Descriptions  Data Sources  Units 
Bilateral imports  Log of nominal bilateral imports  World Trade 
Analyzer
a 
Log of 1000 
US dollar 
Log of nominal GDP  Log of the product of nominal GDPs.  World Development 
Indicator
b 
Log of dollar 
Log of nominal per 
capita GDP 





Log of dollar 
Log of distance  Log of distance between trading 
partners 
World Factbook
c  Log of mile 
Common border  If two countries share a common border, 
Common border = 1, otherwise 0. 
World Factbook
c  Dummy 
variable.  
Common language  If two countries share same main 
language, Common language = 1, 
otherwise 0. 
World Factbook
c  Dummy 
variable. 
Common colonizer  If two countries had same colonizer, 
Common colonizer = 1, otherwise 0.  
World Factbook
c  Dummy 
variable. 
Colonial relationship  If two countries were involved in a 
colonial relationship with each other, 
Colonial relationship = 1, otherwise 0. 
World Factbook
c  Dummy 
variable. 
Common currency  If two countries share the same currency 
or a unit exchange rate, Common 






If two countries belong to the same 
RTA in the year of observation, Same-
RTA = 1, otherwise 0; see Appendix 3 
for RTA list. 
WTO
e  Dummy 
variable. 
Export-RTA  If exporting country belongs to a RTA 
and importing does not, Export-RTA = 




Import-RTA  If importing country belongs to a RTA 
and exporting country does not, Import-





a “World Trade Analyzer” (WTA) has been assembled and managed by Statistics Canada. Information of 
the data is available at http://www.statcan.ca/bsolc/english/bsolc?catno=65F0016XCB (last accessed on 
2007.8.26). 
b The source for nominal GDP is World Bank’s “World Development Indicators”. When data are 
unavailable from World Bank, missing observations are filled from the “Penn World Table” and IMF’s 
“International Financial Statistics”. 
c “World Factbook”, CIA; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html (last 
accessed on 2007.8.26). 
d The basic source for currency unions is the IMF's “Schedule of Par Values” and issues of the IMF's 
“Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions”. Data are supplemented by 
the yearly “Statesman's Year Book”. 
e The data available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last accessed on 
2007.8.26).   34
Appendix 2 
Country list 
ALBANIA DOMINICAN  RP  KUWAIT  RWANDA 
ALGERIA  ECUADOR  LAOS P.DEM.R  SAUDI ARABIA 
ANGOLA EGYPT  LIBERIA  SENEGAL 
ARGENTINA  EL SALVADOR  LIBYA  SERVIA & MONTE. 
AUSTRALIA EQ.  GUINEA MADAGASCAR  SEYCHELLES 
AUSTRIA ETHIOPIA MALAWI SIERRA  LEONE 
BAHAMAS FIJI  MALAYSIA  SINGAPORE 
BAHRAIN FINLAND  MALDIVES  SLOVAK  RP 
BANGLADESH FRANCE  MALI  SOLOMON  ISLDS 
BARBADOS GABON  MALTA  SOMALIA 
BELGIUM-LUX. GAMBIA  MAURITANIA  SOUTH  AFRICA 
BELIZE GERMANY  MAURITIUS  SPAIN 
BENIN GHANA  MEXICO  SRI  LANKA 
BERMUDA  GREECE  MONGOLIA  ST KITTS NEV 
BHUTAN GUATEMALA  MOROCCO  SUDAN 
BOLIVIA GUINEA  MOZAMBIQUE  SURINAME 
BRAZIL GUINEA-BISSAU  NEPAL  SWEDEN 
BULGARIA GUYANA  NETHERLANDS SWITZERLAND 
BURKINA FASO  HAITI  NEW ZEALAND  SYRN ARAB RP 
BURUNDI HONDURAS  NICARAGUA  TANZANIA 
CAMBODIA HONG  KONG  NIGER  THAILAND 
CAMEROON HUNGARY  NIGERIA  TOGO 
CANADA ICELAND NORWAY  TRINIDAD  TBG 
CENTRAL AFR. REP.  INDIA  OMAN  TUNISIA 
CHAD INDONESIA  PAKISTAN  TURKEY 
CHILE IRAN  PANAMA  UGANDA 
CHINA IRAQ  PAPUA  N.GUINEA  UK 
COLOMBIA  IRELAND  PARAGUAY  UNTD ARAB EM 
COMOROS ISRAEL  PERU  URUGUAY 
CONGO ITALY  PHILIPPINES  USA 
CONGO DEM. REP.  JAMAICA  POLAND  VENEZUELA 
COSTA RICA  JAPAN  PORTUGAL  VIETNAM 
COTE D'IVOIRE  JORDAN  QATAR  YEMEN 
CYPRUS KENYA  REUNION  ZAMBIA 
DENMARK KIRIBATI  ROMANIA  ZIMBABWE 
DJIBOUTI KOREA  RP  RUSSIA     
Notes: RUSSIA includes former USSR before 1989, SLOVAKIA includes former Czechoslovakia before 
1993, and SERVIA AND MONTENEGRO includes former Yugoslavia before 1992. 
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Appendix 3 
Eleven regional trade agreements in the sample 
Name  Country  Year of entry 



















































St.Kitts and Nevis 
St.Lucia 


































































































Source: Official website of World Trade Organization (WTO) and individual RTAs.  
Notes: Counties shown in parentheses below RTA names are member countries for which we do not have 
bilateral import data. CACM was suspended in 1970-1990.   37
Appendix 4 
Firm-level data description 
Variable  Description  Data Source  Units 
Inside RTA sale 
share (%) 
Ratio of firm’s sales in RTA countries 
other than the country of origin to total 
sales (%). 
Annual Reports
a  Ratio 
Outside RTA sale 
share (%) 
Ratio of firm’s sales in RTA countries 
outside the RTA of origin (%). 
Annual Reports
a   Ratio 
Inside RTA asset 
share (%) 
Ratio of firm’s assets in RTA countries 
other than the country of origin to total 
assets (%). 
Annual Reports
a  Ratio 
Outside RTA asset 
share (%) 
Ratio of firm’s assets in RTA countries 
outside the RTA of origin (%). 
Annual Reports
a   Ratio 
Firm Size   Log of firms’ sales.  Compustat Global & 
Emerging Market
b 
Log of US 
dollars  
R&D Intensity  Ratio of firm’s R&D expenditures to 
total assets. 





Ratio of firm’s advertising expenditures 
to total assets. 
Compustat Global & 
Emerging Market  
Ratio 
Competitiveness  Firm’s (Sales – operating expenses)/ 
sales.  
Compustat Global & 
Emerging Market  
 




Expected growth  Firm’s (salest / salest-10)





Ratio of Inside RTA’s GDP (excluding 














      
Notes:  
a Data collected from annual reports of 120 MNEs domiciled in three RTAs –ASEAN, the EU, and 
NAFTA– and three non-EU countries –Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey–. The reports cover the period 
2000-2006. 
b The data sets are available from Standard and Poor’s. 
c See Appendix 1 for source.   38
Appendix 5 
Summary statistics and correlation matrix of firm-level data 
 Mean 
(S.D.) 
1. 2. 3, 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.  10.  11. 
1. Inside RTA sale  
    share (%) 
21.2 
(18.8) 
            
2. Outside RTA sale  
    share (%) 
42.0 
(21.7) 
0 . 1 3              
3. Inside RTA asset  
    share (%) 
15.4 
(20.3) 
0.77  0.08            
4. Outside RTA asset  
    share (%) 
36.2 
(21.6) 
0.07  0.77  -0.04           
5. Firm Size  9.23 
(2.16) 
0.00  0.10  0.10  0.19          
6. R&D Intensity  0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.05  0.32  -0.04  -0.08  0.14         
7. Adv. Intensity  0.12 
(0.13) 
0.25 0.24 0.23 0.20 -0.21 0.06           
8. Competitiveness  0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.25 -0.12 -0.23 -0.11 0.07  0.08  -0.29       
9. Leverage  0.82 
(0.94) 
0.31 0.04 0.33 0.03 0.33 -0.05 0.11 -0.04       
10. Expected growth  1.06 
(0.38) 
-0.12 0.01 -0.14 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.10     
11. Inside RTA  
      MKTSIZE (%) 
27.0 
(22.9) 
0.56 0.19 0.55 0.19 0.22 -0.06 0.09 -0.11 0.61 -0.10   
12. Outside RTA  
      MKTSIZE (%) 
70.7 
(23.0) 
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1 It should be noted that some are bilateral and of little importance for trade flows (Pomfret, 2006: p.42). 
2 The terminology of building and stumbling blocs was first introduced by Bhagwati (1991). For relevant 
literature on this topic, see Section 7 in Panagariya (2000). 
3 Many political economy models of RTAs emphasize trade diversion; see Panagariya (2000).  
4 With homothetic preferences, consumers with different incomes but facing the same prices demand 
goods in the same proportions. 
5 The third dummy permits to distinguish intra-bloc export increases from RTA-induced export increases 
occurring at the expense of exports to nonmember countries. Welfare is better measured by nonmembers’ 
imports or bloc exports that by nonmembers’ exports or bloc imports; see Soloaga and Winters (pages 5 
and 6).  
6  It should be noted that country pair fixed (random) effects and year fixed effects provide a more flexible 
error term structure (i.e. uijt = hij + zt + εijt) than Bikker’s (i.e., uij = vi + wj + εij; p.327, notations have 
been adjusted to compare two models.). 
7 Frankel (1997: p.134-136) also reports no significant difference between the “exogenous” specification 
and a specification with the lagged dependent variable, which is the simplest way to control for possible 
endogeneity. 
8 Regression results are not shown but are available upon request. Similar findings are reported by 
Barldwin and Taglioni (2006). 
9 The export trade diversion effect is not statistically significant at the 10 per cent. 
10 The export trade diversion effect is significant at the 10 per cent. 
11 The list of firms is available upon request. 
12 Note that the coefficient of ASEAN, which is dropped because of multicollinearity, is equal to the RTA 
coefficient. 